摘要: |
近些年来,我国支农转移支付制度不断调整,支农项目资金统筹使用权部分下放到了省级部门。然而,省级部门自主规划的支农项目并不必然能够实现高绩效。本文通过对村集体经济试点项目在H省X市运行的调研发现,省级部门的项目规划能力是影响项目绩效高低的重要因素之一。项目规划设计如果违背“恰适性”原则,在落实中会因任务目标与组织能力不相符合而被敷衍执行。项目制改革后,省级部门需要为项目绩效的高低承担起更多的责任。但是,项目采取何种形式,并不是委托方的一厢情愿。在项目组织结构日趋扁平化的形势下,支农项目管理要突破上下级间“考核-应对”的单一组织关系,给予项目执行者充分的参与空间,以参与式治理解决项目中的信息不对称问题,并为实现上下级间的利益兼容提供可能。 |
关键词: 项目制 名义达标 组织模式 参与式治理 |
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基金项目:国家社科规划基金重大项目“健全城乡基层治理体系研究”(20ZDA080);中国政法大学“钱端升学者”支持计划 |
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"Strong Target-Weak Incentive" and Selective Implementation of Agricultural Support Projects |
DU JIAO
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China University of Political Science and Law
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Abstract: |
With the restructuring of China''s agricultural support system, the right to coordinate the use of project funds has been partially delegated to provincial departments .However, projects that are planned autonomously by provincial departments do not necessarily bring high performance.This paper has found that the planning capacity of provincial departments is an important factor in improving performance through research in city X, province H.The project would be implemented perfunctorily if not designed in accordance with the principle of ''appropriateness'' .Provincial departments need to take on greater responsibility after project-based reform.However,the form that a project takes is not the wishful thinking of the commissioning party.In the context of an increasingly flat project-based structure,participatory governance addresses information asymmetries in projects and offers the possibility of achieving compatibility of interests between upper and lower levels of government. |
Key words: Project System Nominal Compliance Organizational Model Participatory Governance |